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The fishing business is booming.1 In 2014, fishermen around the globe
landed 81.5 million tons of wild marine fish. 2 Fishing has also been expanding
with thirteen out of the twenty-five major fishing countries, increasing their
2014 catch by over a 100,000 tons from 2013.3 A growing urban-based middle
class with a preference for consuming fish is at least partially fueling this
increase that may have long-term consequences for both fish stocks and fish-
dependent communities. 4 As the fishing business continues to grow, numerous
coastal communities that have historically depended on fisheries for their
livelihood and basic nutrition are experiencing scarcity.5 This Article explores
tensions that have arisen not just between Global North and Global South
States, but also between Global South States over the sustainable
management of fisheries, particularly for small-scale fisheries.
The first section of this Article will discuss fisheries conflicts between the
Global North and Global South with an illustration of this tension through the
presence of EU fishing vessels in Western African waters, as well as tensions
'Anastasia Telesetsky, Professor, University of Idaho College of Law, Natural Resources and
Environmental Law Program.
I FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. [FOA], THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE:
CONTRIBUTING TO FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION FOR ALL 10 (2016), www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf
[hereinafter FAO SOFIA 2016 REPORT].
2 Id. at 4 (stating that while 82.6 million tons were captured in 2011, the landing number from
2014 reflects a trend towards increasing amounts of fish being captured with 79.7 million tons
captured in 2012 and 81 million tons captured in 2014).
3 Id. at 10-11 (stating that countries reporting increases include: China, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Myanmar, Norway, Chile, Korea, Morocco, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Ecuador).
4 Katie Lebling, Fishing for Answers: Understanding Drivers and Environmental Impacts of
China's Distant Water Fishing Fleet, WILsON CENTER CHINA ENVIRONMENT FORUM 4 (2013),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Fishing%20for%2OAnswers.pdf.
I Christopher D. Golden et. al., Fall in Fish Catch Threatens Human Health, 534 NATURE 317, 318
(June 15, 2016).
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among Global South fishing States illustrated by the South China Sea dispute.
The second section describes the duty of due diligence for States to ensure
flagged vessels fish responsibly and summarizes soft law efforts by the Food
and Agriculture Organization to address some of the pressures on small-scale
fishers. While the exercise of due diligence by States will contribute to a
reduction in illegal fishing or unreported fishing, even where States accept
responsibility to combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated ("IUU") fishing,
this alone will not directly revive already heavily impacted fisheries. The final
section of this Article suggests the need to strengthen alternatives to State
governance of fisheries, such as industry and NGO-facilitated Fisheries
Investment Projects ("FIPs").
I. GLOBAL NORTH-SOUTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH-SOUTH INDUSTRIAL FISHING
CHALLENGES
Historically, fishermen pursued their livelihoods close to shore. Operating
in wooden boats, in often difficult weather conditions, with generally small
nets, fishing was a risky business. With the advent of the Industrial
Revolution, the ability to power boats reliably across stormy oceans, and the
development of deployable durable polymer nets, made industrial fishing a
highly efficient and profitable enterprise. 6 As Global North States depleted fish
stocks within their immediate coastal waters, they began to look for new
fishing fertile grounds. The Grand Banks fishery located above productive
submarine shelves off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada
tragically illustrates consequences of the race to fish. Over the course of several
centuries, fleets from England, France, Portugal, Canada, Russia, and the
United States exploited the marine resources. 7 As net and trawl technologies
improved, fish landings-catches landed in foreign or domestics ports-
increased as fishermen could fish deeper waters. In 1995, the Canadian
government closed all cod and flounder fisheries on the nose and tail of the
Grand Banks.8
As Global North fisheries are closed or restricted due to regulations
covering fishing effort and fishing capacity, global fishing fleets including
Global South fleets from China have relocated to the Global South.9 Some
fleets have introduced new and more efficient ways to harvest. For example,
after the 1950s entry of Japanese industrial fishing vessels into Pacific Ocean
tuna fisheries, U.S. vessels replaced their pole-and-line methods with purse
seines made of highly durable material that could be deployed for miles and
6 For an excellent history of early industrial fishing, see generally CALLUM ROBERTS, THE
UNNATURAL HISTORY OF THE SEA (2007).
1 The Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap, GOv'T OF CANADA: FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA (June
8, 2012), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.calinternationallmediafbk-grandbanks-eng.htm.
8 Id.
9 See Lebling, supra note 4.
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then mechanically retrieved. 10 Japanese vessels that had been formerly using
live bait, which required them to stay close to a shore base, adopted purse seine
technology dissolving the need for bait. Eventually, other distant water fishing
States from both the Global North and South including Korea, Taiwan, China,
New Zealand, Philippines, and Indonesia have deployed purse seiners. 11 The
overcapacity of fishing vessels, particularly purse seiners, has substantially
impacted the abundance of some tuna stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean such as bigeye and yellowfin tuna. 12 While Pacific States are
grappling with establishing fisheries management through Vessel Day
Schemes to restrict the number of vessels authorized to fish on any given day,
IUU fishing is undermining their fishery management efforts.
In February 2016, a research report estimated the total volume of product
either harvested or transshipped involving IUU activity in Pacific tuna
fisheries is 306,440 tons with an economic value of approximately $616
million. 13 Much of this IUU activity is taking place by licensed vessels. 14 With
a combined GDP of $8.6 billion, IUU fishing for small Pacific Island States may
be leading to losses of 7 percent of GDP for Pacific Islands. 15
As a result of less active fisheries management and, in some cases, even
more limited enforcement, distant water fishing nations from both the Global
North and South are actively fishing in the coastal waters of West African
States and the immediately adjacent high seas. 16 As in the Pacific, the loss of
fish to IUU fishing has economic consequences for coastal African States. In
2012, fisheries economists estimated that Senegal lost $300 million of potential
10 Kate Barclay, History of Industrial Tuna Fishing in the Pacific Islands: A HMAP Asia Project
Paper 7 (China Research Ctr., U. of Tech. Sydney, Working Paper No. 169, 2010),
https://www.murdoch.edu.aulResearch-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/ document/working-
papers/wpl69.pdf.
11 Id. at 8.
12 Id. at 17.
12 DUNCAN SOUTER ET AL., ASIA PAC, TOWARDS THE QUANTIFICATION OF ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED
AND UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 36 (2016),
http://www.m2cms.com.au/uploaded/5/ZN1981%20-%20MRAG%20AP%20FFA%20IUU%2ORepor
t.pdf.
14 Id. at 5-7.
15 PACIFIC ISLAND SMALL STATES, THE WORLD BANK (2016),
http://data.worldbank.org/region/pacific-island-small-states (see GDP graph; then select year
2015). Pacific Island Small States are defined by the World Bank to include: Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
and Vanuatu. Id.
16 Daniel Pauly et al., China's Distant- Water Fisheries in the 21" Century, 15 FISH & FISHERIES 3,
474-88 (2014) (describing China's 900 vessel distant-water fishing fleet deployed outside of North
Asia and indicating that this fleet underreports its catches); Database on EU External Fleet, WHO
FISHES FAR, http://www.whofishesfar.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (providing a searchable
database for all EU fisheries access agreements outside of the European Union including several
agreements with West African States including Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal).
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revenue from IUU fishing, which was equivalent to 2 percent of its GDP.17 IUU
fishing not only has impacts on the economy but also on community health and
well-being. This is because coastal communities depend on fish as their
primary source of protein and fatty acids and are unable to procure subsistence
food. The decline of fish stocks due to IUU fishing is particularly critical in
Africa where several countries derive a large portion of animal protein from
marine fish including: Sierra Leone (57 percent), Ghana (52 percent), Senegal
(37 percent), Angola (29 percent), Cameroon (25 percent) and Nigeria (23
percent). is
Global North States, including Member States of the European Union
("EU"), have access to prime Western African fishing grounds as a result of
negotiated access agreements.19 Despite recurring questions about the
sustainability of these agreements from environmental, social, and economic
perspectives, eighteen additional access agreements have been negotiated
since the first was signed in 1980 between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. This
first agreement covered mainly coastal and demersal species substantially
impacted by industrial fishing practices. 20 While these agreements are
intended to help States better manage their surplus marine resources, in
practice, the agreements have inadvertently facilitated heavier exploitation of
Global South resources. For example, one version of the EU-Mauritania
Agreement covered shrimp capture but did not cover the bycatch from Spanish
shrimp trawling activities. 21 In practice, Spanish shrimp trawlers were
reaping the financial rewards of bringing in large number of demersal fish as
bycatch with no payments to the coastal State for these fish. Likewise, Spanish
longliners have been reaping the financial rewards of capturing sharks that
are not covered under various the partnership and access agreements. 22
Even while more recent partnership agreements have remedied some of
the concerns of earlier versions of fisheries agreements as classic business
agreements, criticism remains that the presence of EU fishing vessels places
burdens on coastal communities. For example, in 2015, the EU renegotiated
and extended its agreement with Mauritania for four more years to allow 100
EU vessels to operate in Mauritania's waters and catch 280,000 tons of shrimp,
17 ALFONSO DANIELS ET AL., WESTERN AFRICA'S MISSING FISH: THE IMPACTS OF ILLEGAL,
UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING AND UNDER-REPORTING CATCHES BY FOREIGN FLEETS
(2016), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf.
18 CAL. ENVTL. ASSOCIATES, APPENDIX 6: COUNTRY AND MARKET INFORMATION, CHARTING A
COURSE TO SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES (2012), http://chartingacourse.org/download/94.
19 Fr6d6ric Le Manach et al., European Union's Public Fishing Access Agreement in Developing
Countries, 8(11) PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2013). These agreements were initially called "fisheries
agreements" and since 2004 have been called "fisheries partnership agreements." Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id.
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tuna, pelagic fish and demersal fish.23 Environmental groups and coastal
community groups have expressed concerns the EU and coastal fishing vessels
may be competing for small pelagic fish with consequences not just for
Mauritania, but also neighboring States like Senegal.24
Where access to a valuable fishery ground in the Global South proves
difficult due to closures to foreign vessels or a lack of access agreement, Global
North companies and some companies from powerful Global South States such
as China may still gain access to such limited fisheries through joint venture
agreements. In many cases, Global South governments loathe to interfere with
any of these contractual arrangements because of a desire to attract foreign
direct investment and secure sources of export revenue. 25
In Senegal, joint ventures are common because they offer distant water
fishing companies access to the Senegalese flag, which provides special
benefits under fisheries management schemes. As the Deputy Secretary
General of the National Fishing Observers Union in Senegal commented
recently, "[m]ost of our industrial fishing companies are just front companies
for foreign operators; the only national thing they have is the Senegalese
flag." 26 Flying the Senegalese flag means a vessel does not need to carry
fisheries observers and typically results in lighter sanctions for any fishing law
infractions.27 Additionally, charters have been employed by European Union
nationals in Liberia and Ghana to gain access to coastal waters. 28
2 Mauritania: Fisheries Partnership Agreement, EUR. COMMISSION: FISHERIES,
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/mauritania-en (last updated Feb. 13,
2017).
24 Till Bruckner, Greenpeace Calls for End of Private Fishing Deals in West Africa, Questions E. U.
Food Security Claims, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Aug. 3, 2015, 10:47 AM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/till-bruckner/fiti-overfishing-africa-c_b_7921196.html.
25 Eric Mungatana et. al., Fisheries Resource Accounts for the Maputo Coastal Districts of
Mozambique, in IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTS: CASE STUDIES FROM EASTERN AND
SOUTHERN AFRICA 73 (Rashid M. Hassan & Eric D. Mungatana eds.) (describing the commercial
Mozambique fishing sector as dominated by joint ventures).
26 VOICES FROM AFRICAN ARTISANAL FISHERIES: CALLING FOR AN AFRICAN YEAR OF ARTISANAL
FISHERIES 11 (Gaoussou Gueye ed., Aboubacar Alpha Barry et al. trans., 2016), http://www.caopa-
africa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Voices-from-african-Artisanal-Fisheries.pdf.
27 Id. at 11-12. The report states,
When vessels flying the flag of Senegal are arrested, they are almost exempted
of sanction, so to speak, to save the jobs, people say. For the same infringement,
- for instance, carrying on an activity non-compliant with its license category-,
a foreign vessel will be fined 50 million CFA francs. While for a vessel flying
the Senegalese flag, it is only 10 million CFA francs.
Id.
28 Irina Popescu, European Parliamentary Research Serv., Expanding the Network of EU Tuna
Fisheries Agreements, PE 586.611, 3 (July 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDataletudes/BRIE/2016/586611/EPRSBRI(2016)586611_EN.
pdf.
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Global South actors have replicated the dynamics of Global North actors
in fishing not just off the West Coast of Africa, but also off the coast of States
who identify with the Global North. For example, Japan is contending with
Chinese vessels operating illegal drift nets (10 nautical miles to 100 nautical
miles in length) where the high seas meet the Japanese exclusive economic
zone. 29 China, a State that self-identifies with the Global South, has overfished
its own territorial waters by a magnitude two times what is sustainable. 30
China's distant water fishing fleet of approximately 500 vessels is deployed
across the globe and there are numerous instances of illegal fishing. 31 The
South China Sea conflict, involving multiple States across the Global South, is
believed to be fueled in part by a "race to fish" with multiple States chasing
valuable fish targets including tuna. 32
Over the years, there have been proposals for joint management of the
fisheries and cooperation under UNCLOS Article 197, which urges States to
cooperate "as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.""3 Given the
heightened tensions in the region, cooperation is unlikely to materialize soon.
To create conditions for cooperation, States must, at a minimum, exercise due
diligence over their fleets and nationals. The next section describes the basic
due diligence requirements of States as articulated by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
II. STATE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO DUE DILIGENCE
Given the increasing rate of distant water fishing from a variety of nations,
including both Global North and Global South States, do States have an
obligation to exercise due diligence over the vessels that they flag? In 2013,
the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission ("SRFC"), a West African fisheries
29 Charlie Campbell, The Fight to Save the World's Seas From China's Bloated Fishing Industry,
TIME: WORLD (Aug. 24, 2016), http://time.com/4463943/japan-china-fishing-marine-iuu-
environment-google-skytruth.
30 Id. (noting that 13 million tons of fish were removed from Chinese waters even though the
maximum sustainable yield has an upper limit of 8-9 million tons).
31 Id. (observing a boat that appeared to be operating in Mexican and New Zealand waters based
on geographical positioning records operating illegally off the coast of Guinea and South America
respectively).
32 Rachel Bale, One of the World's Biggest Fisheries is on the Verge of Collapse, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC:
WILDLIFE WATCH (Aug. 29, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-south-
china-sea-overfishing-threatens-collapse (noting that fish in the region provide food and jobs for
approximately 3.7 million people in ten countries with competing claims to resources that are
impacting both food security and economic growth in the region; also noting that seven overlapping
sets of fisheries laws compete within the region).
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
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organization representing several States, 34 brought a request for an advisory
opinion on behalf of its members to understand "the obligations of the flag
State in cases where IUU fishing activities are conducted within the Exclusive
Economic zone of third-party States." 35 The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea ("ITLOS") concluded that while the "primary responsibility for
taking the necessary measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing
rests with the coastal State" this "does not release other States from their
obligations in this regard." 36 The Tribunal then delineated the responsibility
of distant water fishing States to coastal States.
First, a distant water fishing State must ensure compliance by its flagged
vessels with the law and regulations of the coastal State. Under SRFC rules,
flag States operating within the SRFC region must attempt to ascertain
whether its flagged vessels, with appropriate fishing licenses, are following
regulations, including those related to transshipping fish from certain ports
and keeping written catch records. To ensure compliance, a flag State "must
adopt the necessary administrative measures to ensure that fishing vessels
flying its flag are not involved in activities which will undermine the flag
State's responsibilities under the Convention in respect of the conservation and
management of marine living resources." 37
A distant water fishing State has the additional obligation of not only
ensuring compliance by flagged vessels but also by "nationals engaged in
fishing activities within the exclusive economic zone of a coastal State."38 This
language extends a State's responsibility beyond its own flagged vessel to cover
its nationals who may be taking part in fishing operations under a flag of
convenience or coastal State flag. Taken together, the Tribunal concludes "that
flag States are obliged to take the necessary measures to ensure that their
nationals and vessels flying their flag are not engaged in IUU fishing
activities." 39
The ITLOS decision is remarkable because it encompasses all distant
water fishing nations regardless of whether they are from the Global North or
South. All States are recognized as having a "responsibility to ensure" that
both their nationals and vessels are acting in conformity with coastal State
fisheries laws, and there is no differentiation made for implementation of State
obligations on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities. The
3 State members include Guinea, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal,
and Sierra Leone. Id.
35 Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Case
No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, para. 1,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no.2 1/advisory-opinion/C2 1AdvOp0
2.04.pdf.
36 Id. at paras. 106 & 108.
3 Id. at para. 119.
3 Id. at para. 123 (citing art. 62(4) of UNCLOS).
3 Id. at para. 93.
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"responsibility to ensure" is a "due diligence obligation," which means the State
must "take all necessary measures to ensure compliance and to prevent IUU
fishing by fishing vessels flying its flag." 40 At a minimum, as pertains to its
flagged vessels, a flag State must provide enforcement, oversight of vessel
compliance with coastal conservation measures, sufficient sanctions to deter
IUU fishing (including deprivation of benefits from IUU fishing), proper
markings on a vessel for identification purposes, and investigation of
allegations of IUU fishing. Even if coastal States have a primary responsibility
to combat IUU fishing in their own waters, flag States have a proactive role to
play in order to satisfy their "due diligence obligations."
While the ITLOS decision is only an advisory opinion, it is a clear
articulation of the substantive content of flag State responsibility. States have
been receptive, albeit slowly, to the April 2015 decision. Ideally, distant water
fishing States might increase their patrols or provide patrol assistance to
coastal States to ensure the flagged vessels and nationals from the distant
water fishing States are not engaged in IUU fishing. Among the known active
distant water fishing nations operating in West African waters, only the
European Union has reacted directly to the advisory opinion. While not yet
finally approved as of February 2017, the European Commission is discussing
the adoption of a regulation on the sustainable management of external fishing
fleets. 41 The regulation would apply to both EU vessels operating in non-EU
waters as well as on the high seas. 42 It Will cover vessels that were formerly
flagged to EU Member States any time during the five years preceding a
request for fishing authorization if the vessel had been reflagged to a non-EU
State for two years or less before returning to the EU fleet.43 EU Member
States must require EU vessels to obtain proper fishing authorization, which
requires, in the case where there is no sustainable fisheries partnership
agreement, evidence of the sustainability of a planned fishing activity either
on the basis of an RFMO scientific report, or on the basis of "a scientific
evaluation provided by the third country[,] and/or by a regional fisheries
management organization." 44 Applications for fishing authorizations must
include the address, email, and telephone of the vessel owner, the economic
40 Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Case
No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, para. 124,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/caseno.21/advisory-opinion/C21_AdvOp_0
2.04.pdf.
41 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Sustainable
Management of External Fishing Fleets, Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1006/2008,
European Commission (2015) 636 final (Dec. 10, 2015). The European Parliament has adopted a
legislative resolution to revise portions of the Commission's proposal. Sustainable Management of
External Fishing Fleets (February 2, 2017) P8_TA-PROV(2017)0015 (hereinafter Proposal for
Regulation].
42 Id. at art. 1.
43 Id. at art. 6.
44 Id. at art. 18(c).
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operator, and the master of the vessel. 45 EU vessels are required to provide
catch and landing declaration to the coastal State as well as the EU flag State,
who is required to cross-check the data provided.46
There are no English-language public records of responses to the ITLOS
decision from other distant water fishing nations such as China, Korea, and
Taiwan.47 At a minimum, the exercise of due diligence should require each
distant water fishing State to make publicly available a strategy of how the
flag State intends to enforce against certain known IUU activities by its vessels
and nationals including:
* fishing without a license or without a quota allocation;
* fishing in closed areas;
* fishing with illegal gear;
* capturing protected species;
* possessing more than one flag or being registered in more than one
State;
* not reporting or underreporting catch.
The need for a State to undertake "all necessary measures" is likely to
entail greater investments in supervision from a flag State and might lead to
requirements for distant water vessels to carry qualified observers and operate
Vessel Monitoring Systems at all times. Both Global North and South flag
States may need to invest in satellite detection systems and regular inspection
patrols. Where a State is unable to conduct patrols, it may want to enter into
boarding agreements with the Coastal State or other States that are patrolling
in the area. The status quo in West African waters will not be sufficient. To
offer more specific guidance to nationals and vessels, States may want to follow
the lead of the European Union in its efforts to improve transparency of the
fishing activities of its vessels in non-EU waters.
III. FISHERIES IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS AND THE FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE
Government due diligence efforts in support of a State's responsibility to
ensure that its distant water fishing vessels and nationals are not participating
in IUU fishing are essential. These efforts alone, however, will not be enough
to address impending food security and livelihood crises. In addition to the
North-South challenges and South-South challenges described above, there are
challenges within coastal communities as too many artisanal fisheries over-
extract marine resources by fishing far beyond the maximum sustainable yield
for a given region. A fisheries administrator from Senegal described how the
5 Id. at annex 1.
46 Proposal for Regulation, supra note 41.
47 The author searched for the terms "Advisory Opinion," "due diligence," and "IUU fishing" to
determine if there were any public responses that were available in English to explain due
diligence efforts of non-SRFC states to respond to potential IUU fishing activities. The author's
search did not reveal any sources.
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overcapacity problem arises through uncontrolled access to resources: "A
farmer leaving his remote village, having no idea about fishing, can come here,
have a pirogue [wooden boat] built and declare himself a fisherman." 48
States are partially to blame for the declining marine resource biomass in
their coastal fisheries because they fail to work with existing communities to
properly manage them. States have a number of policy options they can
exercise to reduce both fishing efforts and capacity within coastal fisheries
including enforcing customary tenure rights, introducing territorial use rights,
and catch quotas for impacted fisheries. All these management options,
however, will require adequate monitoring and enforcement to ensure success.
A number of Global South States have only recently begun to tackle
overcapacity, but immediate interventions are necessary to conserve what
remaining biomass there is and invest in the future of the fishery. Two
interventions from private entities may contribute to more rational fisheries
management by assisting both directly, and indirectly, low-capacity
communities in the Global South: privately funded fisheries improvement
programs and the Fisheries Transparency Initiative.
One option for improving global fisheries is restoring commercial fish
stocks to improve reduction of competition in imperiled fisheries. To further
restoration objectives, a direct management initiative by a variety of private
actors, including civil society groups such as the World Wildlife Fund and for-
profit fishing companies, fund the creation of fisheries improvement projects.
The projects originally served to assist communities in preparing to meet
Marine Stewardship Council standards for fisheries certification. While each
"fisheries improvement project" ("FIP") is different in terms of its objectives,
all of the projects operate to strengthen private environmental governance
control over local fisheries by investing in either the creation or the revival of
community-based fisheries management institutions.
While the actual efficacy of FIPs in restoring marine biodiversity is still
uncertain, FIPs have improved multi-stakeholder engagement in the
management process and multi-stakeholder communication. For example, a
FIP to improve Indonesian Snapper can receive certification by the Marine
Stewardship Council, an independent evaluator for the environmental
sustainability of fishing operations, by conducting a biological stock
assessment, organizing a snapper buyers group among forty U.S. companies,
creating a single sustainability standard, and coordinating a snapper producer
association.49
While each FIP is different, the long-term efficacy of a FIP may depend on
the ability of stakeholders not just to coordinate within a single community but
48 VOICES FROM AFRICAN ARTISANAL FISHERIES, supra note 26, at 9.
49 See generally Indonesia Sustainable Snapper Initiative, SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES PARTNERSHIP
(2011),
http://sfpcms.sustainablefish.org.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/06/29/Snapper%2OWhite%20Paper-
updated% 20 June%202011_Draft-98e3b8f6.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
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across communities and potentially across borders, depending on the nature of
the particular stock. Additionally, FIP facilitators, whether they are NGOs or
companies, may want to consider improving the social cohesion within a fishing
community. Here, FIP facilitators may want to remind States of the 2011 Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ("FAO") Voluntary
Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries that identified
small-scale fisheries as a primary driver for poverty alleviation and
sustainable development in the Global South.50 Guideline six calls for States
to promote social development within fishing communities, including "human
resource development such as health, education, literacy, digital inclusion and
other skills of a technical nature that generate added value to the fisheries
resources as well as awareness raising." 51 The guidelines also recognize the
"importance of children's well-being and education for the future of the
children themselves and of society at large." 52
While these types of social interventions are not the type of "due diligence"
contemplated by ITLOS in its recent advisory opinion, this type of social
investment by Global South States in the capacity and well-being of its citizens
can yield long-term dividends not just for communities, but for resources upon
which the communities depend. When Global North States extend
development aid to Global South States for projects, such as improving
fisheries stocks, Donor States may also want to consider contributing
simultaneously to related social development projects, such as the
development of training centers for fishermen and schools for fishermen's
children. Where these types of loans and grants are not forthcoming, Global
South States may want to consider specific requests to support community-
enhancement projects within fishing communities. Where there is a basis for
trust among community members, fishermen are more likely to cooperate with
community coastal fishery rules.
A second potential governance intervention that may help with the
recovery of impacted fisheries is the Fisheries Transparency Initiative
("FiTI"),53 a conceptual initiative modeled on the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative. 54 The FiTI was launched by the NGO Transparency
International as a global initiative to be adopted by individual States.5 5 It is
5o U.N. FAO, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR SECURING SUSTAINABLE SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE
CONTEXT OF FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY ERADICATION ix (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i4356e.pdf.
51 Id. at 8.
52 Id. at 10.
53 See generally FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, AT A GLANCE: RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION (2016), http://fisheriestransparency.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/FiTIAtaGlanceEN_20160210-1.pdf.
5 See MEMORANDUM FROM FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, FITI NEWSLETTER 2 (Oct. 2015)
http://fisheriestransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/FiTINewsletter_20151029.pdf.
55 FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 53.
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described as a "voluntary initiative with mandatory requirements" where
States that chose to join are expected to comply with requirements to gather,
verify, and disclose certain information about fisheries.56 Principles adopted in
Nouakchott, Mauritania form the basis of the initiative.5 7 Specifically, States
agreed that sustainable fisheries are essential for "food security, poverty
alleviation and sustainable development" and that sovereign governments "are
responsible for the sustainable management of fisheries."5 8 States and other
stakeholders agreed transparency is essential for fisheries management and
that achieving transparency requires relevant information be in an accessible
format that can be "shared and verified through the active, free, effective,
meaningful and informed participation of governments, business, civil society,
scientists, and other stakeholders as equal partners."5 9 A number of States
including Mauritania, Indonesia, Senegal, and the Seychelles are in the
process of making commitments to support transparency based on this civil
society initiative.6 0 If these commitments include public sharing of contractual
agreements with foreign nationals, or fishing authorizations for foreign
vessels, this initiative may become a critical tool in helping States meet their
due diligence obligations of providing adequate supervision of their flagged
vessels and nationals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Global fishing is a cross-cutting challenge for both the Global North and
the Global South as States grapple with industrial fishing, destructive fishing
methods, and general overcapacity across all fleets. As with most complex
problems, there is no simple or singular fix that will reduce the current threat
of distant water fishing fleets. Under international treaty and customary law,
States have due diligence obligations to ensure they are not condoning IUU
fishing activities by flagged vessels or nationals. Yet, States, particularly some
of the larger distant water fishing nations, have been silent on how they are
meeting or intend to meet their due diligence obligations. In the absence of
concerted action by States to enforce good fishery management practices by
their vessels or nationals, additional initiatives are required to protect food
security and livelihoods. In some regions, communities, with the support of
private actors, are attempting to revive dwindling stocks to meet the Marine
Stewardship Council sustainability standards. Communities hope to achieve
56 MEMORANDUM FROM FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 54.
57 FISHERIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, NOUAKCHOTT DECLARATION ON THE FISHERIES
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (FiTI) 1 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://fisheriestransparency.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/FiTI_1stlntConf Declaration-EN_20160212.pdf.
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id.
60 Andrea Durighello, UPDATE - Mauritania Urges World to Fight Fishing Secrecy; Three More
Countries Commit, FISH TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://fisheriestransparency.org/update-mauritania-urges-world-to-fight-fishing-secrecy-three-
more-countries-commit.
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this, because sustainable fish are typically valued more in the market than fish
whose sustainability cannot be determined.
A key player in the dynamic between the Global North and the Global
South is the individual consumer, wherever that consumer might be located.
In the Global North, consumers are demanding more from food markets and
restaurants. Because most fish captured are consumed directly by humans, 6 1
consumers can collectively change corporate practices by demanding more
from retailers, who will demand more from wholesalers, who will demand more
from fish processors, who will finally demand more from the fishing fleets. 62
The fish supply chain becomes an important driver of change. Both affluent
individuals and citizens of the Global South can be more demanding of their
supply chains and inquire from food producers about their sustainability
practices to make purchasing decisions that favor certain fishing practices over
others. Increasing rapidly from 500 million people in 2014, the number of
middle class consumers in China and India is projected to reach 1.5 billion
people by 2020.63 This increase in the affluent populations in these nations
alone can have a profound positive or negative effect on fisheries' production,
depending on the populace's awareness and active concern.
What citizens of both the Global North and Global South do not know about
the production of food they consume is problematic if timely interventions are
to be taken. All citizens must recognize the consequences of actions taken in
the name of food production that fail to adequately protect critical marine
resources. Even where States fail to exercise sufficient due diligence in
overseeing their fleets, conscientious consumers can collectively change global
fisheries' rules of engagement for the good of the marine environment.
61 Fish as Food, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/healthy-oceans/the-oceans-
today/fish-as-food (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
62 See e.g., Emiko Terazono, Accord on Eco-Labelling Boosts Sustainable Fishing: Regulators,
Agencies, Retailers and Suppliers are Finding Common Ground, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/871be9f8-a76d-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6 (describing the Global
Seafood Sustainability Initiative).
6 Homi Kharas, How a Growing Global Middle Class Could Save the World's Economy, TRUST
(July 05, 2016), http://magazine.pewtrusts.org/enlarchive/trend-summer-2016/how-a-growing-
global- middle-class-could-save-the-worlds-economy.
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